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Government turnover 
and long-term priorities
Chinese governmental policies are marked by a special 
element of continuity and pursuit of long-term priorities. 
The current five-year plan will remain in force beyond 
the government turnover, as the new government will 
remain bound to the priorities and targets of the old plan 
for another two and a half years. However, the mid-term 
evaluation of the current five-year plan in fall 2013 will 
give the new government the opportunity to adjust objec-
tives and instruments to changed needs and preferences. 
Moreover, the new government can boost its own agendas 
outside of the plan through initiating additional promo-
tional programs and funding schemes. 
 Many announcements of the new government are 
based on programs of the previous administration, from 
long-term environmental and energy plans to integrated 
Never before has any change of leadership in China drawn this much inter-
national attention. The composition of the new party and state leadership in 
China is the result of many years of probing and negotiating within the top 
levels of the Communist Party. New priorities and leadership styles may cause 
fundamental shifts in the mechanisms of governance during the decade that 
China’s new leadership will be in control. Thus, the installation of a new gov-
ernment in China has potentially stronger long-term effects than most govern-
ment turnovers in Western Democracies. 
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New division of responsibilities 
in the central government
The Premier of the State Council leads the central gov-
ernment and oversees its activities. The Executive Meet-
ing of the State Council serves as an inner cabinet and 
comprises of only ten top-ranking officials. Beyond the 
Premier, these are the four Vice Premiers and five State 
Councilors, each of which is responsible for cross-sec-
tional policy areas that encompass several government 
departments (table 1). 
 The outer cabinet is formed of the other (currently 25) 
bodies of the State Council at the ministerial level. They 
include commissions, ministries, the central bank and 
rural-urban development to social redistribution schemes. 
However, this is only the surface of national policy-mak-
ing. Of utmost importance for the near future will be the 
priority shifts that are signaled by new government lead-
ers through top-level personnel decisions and ministerial 
reorganizations. 
 Personnel reshuffles and substantive policy shifts are 
more closely linked in China than they would be in demo-
cratic states. In the Chinese governmental system, lead-
ing positions come with more decision-making authority. 
And new policy initiatives are regularly launched through 
executive action programs, such as medium-term plans, 
rather than parliamentary legislation.
Table 1: Decision-makers and responsibilities in China’s central government (2013)*
* Preliminary information; responsibilities may still be modifi ed by summer. The fi fth State Councilor (SC) who is not included in the table is the Secretary-General 
 of the State Council General Offi ce, Yang Jing. He is in charge of coordinating the government’s day-to-day work but has no specifi c policy responsibilities. 
 CCDI: CCP Central Commission for Discipline Inspection. CCP: Chinese Communist Party. GS: General Secretary of CCP. P: President of the PRC. 
 PB: Politburo member. PM: Premier. PSC: Member in the Politburo Standing Committee. SC: State Councilor. VP: Vice President of the PRC. VPM: Vice Premier. 
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Policy area CCP Politburo-level inner cabinet departments
Foreign and security 
policies
Xi Jinping (GS; PSC; P)
Li Yuanchao (PB; VP)
Yang Jiechi (SCC)
Chang Wanquan (SCC; 
minister of defense)
Foreign affairs; defense; 
military; state safety
Macroecon. stability; 
urbanization; environment; 
innovation
Li Keqiang (PSC; PM)
Zhang Gaoli (PSC; VPM)
Zhang Gaoli (VPM) Planning; public fi nance; central bank; 
land & resources; urban-rural construc-
tion; environment; technology
Social affairs Liu Yandong (PB; VPM) Liu Yandong (VPM) Social affairs; health; 
education; science
Foreign trade; 
agriculture
Wang Yang (PB; VPM) Wang Yang (VPM) Trade; agriculture; forestry; 
water management 
Industry; 
fi nancial market
Ma Kai (PB; VPM) Ma Kai (VPM)
Wang Yong (SC)
Industry; IT; transport; state assets; 
fi nancial market supervision
Public security; justice Meng Jianzhu (PB) Guo Shengkun (SC; 
police minister)
State security; police; justice
Combating corruption Wang Qishan (PSC; CCDI) [CCP-prerogative: 
CCDI in charge]
Disciplinary supervision; 
public prosecutor
3Work reports and 
reform announcements
The work reports of the Premier, the National Develop-
ment and Reform Commission (NDRC) and the Ministry 
of Finance that were presented before the National Peo-
ple’s Congress (NPC) in March 2013 provided important 
information on the priorities of governmental work. The 
outgoing Premier Wen Jiabao reported on the achieve-
ments of the old government in a self-critical manner 
the National Audit Office (table 2). Added to this are doz-
ens of specialized working bodies, offices and steering 
committees of different rank and status. There was less 
far-reaching reorganization on the ministerial level than 
expected when the new Premier took up his office. Only 
two bodies (the Family Planning Commission and the 
Railway Ministry) lost their independence due to merg-
ers with existing State Council bodies. 
Table 2: The central government of the PRC (2013)
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Outer Cabinet (25 ministerial-level bodies of the State Council)
Premier; 4 Vice Premiers, 5 State Councilors
Inner Cabinet (Executive Conference of the State Council)
 Macro-economic coordination:
· National Development and 
 Reform Commission
· Ministry of Finance
· People’s Bank of China (central bank)
 Comprehensive tasks 
 in economic regulation:
· Ministry of Commerce 
· Ministry of Industry and 
 Information Technology
· Ministry of Land and Resources
 Special regulatory tasks:
· Ministry of Environmental Protection
· Ministry of Water Resources
· Ministry of Transport
· Ministry of Agriculture
· Ministry of Housing and 
 Urban-Rural Development
 Internal-administrative affairs:
· Ministry of Supervision
· National Audit Offi ce
 Education, science 
 and culture:
· Ministry of Science 
 and Technology
· Ministry of Education
· Ministry of Culture
 Social affairs:
· National Health and 
 Family Planning Commission
· Ministry of Human Resources 
 and Social Security
· Ministry of Civil Affairs
· State Ethnic Affairs 
 Commission
 Security and justice:
· Ministry of Public Security (police)
· Ministry of State Security 
· Ministry of Justice
 Foreign affairs:
· Ministry of Foreign Affairs
· Ministry of National Defense
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international experience have reached top positions. They 
include the Vice President Li Yuanchao (mid-career train-
ing in the U.S.), Vice Premier Wang Yang (broad experi-
ence in the promotion of foreign trade and investment), 
Minister of Commerce Gao Hucheng (trained in France) 
and Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi (long-term expe-
rience in the precarious relationship with Japan).
 This broad-based international expertise is a posi-
tive result of the 2013 government turnover with a view 
to China’s quickly growing global presence. However, 
this does not entail political generosity, for instance, to-
wards foreign companies. The protagonists of industrial 
and innovation policies that aim at generating globally 
active, Chinese “national champions” are still repre-
sented strongly in the State Council. Therefore, China’s 
investment catalogues and industrial policies that are 
seen as discriminatory by many foreign companies will 
live on under the new government.
 As to foreign affairs, the new government does not 
yet pursue any objectives that deviate from the previ-
ous governmental period. A “new military doctrine”, 
that was claimed to be imminent in a number of West-
ern media reports, cannot be inferred from isolated in-
dividual phrases (“development of a strong army”) or 
vague vision statements (“Chinese Dream”). As a side 
note during the NPC meeting, and addressing the con-
text of present tensions with Japan, a People’s Liberation 
Army (PLA) general, Liu Yuan, who is said to be close to 
Xi Jinping, rejected any suggestions to play down the se-
vere consequences of military disputes. He made it clear 
that China’s military leadership would not strive for war 
adventures. 
 Administrative restructuring to prevent petty and 
accidental conflicts along China’s coasts and to help im-
prove international cooperation will be pursued through 
the integration of five maritime authorities (including 
fishery, anti-smuggling and coast guard units) into the 
overarching National Maritime Administration. 
with regard to the social and ecological situation, while 
he emphasized progress especially in the innovation sys-
tem and infrastructure. The forward-looking sections of 
the government work report, that are always written in 
close coordination with the incoming Premier, contained 
substantive information on the priorities of the new gov-
ernment. Beyond the top-level work reports, numerous 
specific reform announcements could be found in low-
key, technocratic explanations on the reorganization of 
governmental work that were issued as a side note at the 
NPC by the State Council General Office and the Commis-
sion for Public Sector Reform.
Continuities in the 
governmental agenda
Every newly installed Chinese leadership aims to mark 
its ascent to power by catchy slogans. Xi Jinping chose the 
slogan of the “Chinese dream”. At the center of the still-
vague statements lies a “renaissance” of the Chinese Na-
tion, which is supposed to pursue an independent devel-
opment path, based on a strong state, high-performance 
economy and an educated population. The term obviously 
is not intended to indicate a nationalist-aggressive vision, 
but rather an evolutionary unfolding, inwards as well as 
outwards, of a renewed, confident and prosperous Chi-
nese civilization. 
Foreign and security policies
According to statements by Xi Jinping before and after 
his appointment as President of the PRC, China’s interna-
tional exchanges, engagements and contributions are to 
be pursued in a controlled and steady fashion. The effort 
at deepening China’s internationalization is also reflected 
in the composition of the new government. A considerable 
number of decision-makers with a reformist profile and 
5noticeable in the case of the Minister of Environmental 
Protection and the NPC Environmental Committee. Both 
received a particularly high number of countervotes from 
the nearly 3000 NPC delegates (171 countervotes and 47 
abstentions for the Minister of Environmental Protection; 
850 countervotes and 125 abstentions for the NPC’s Envi-
ronmental Committee). 
 China’s national oil and energy companies have a 
reputation of delaying the implementation of less pol-
luting production methods and fuels. However, the gov-
ernment passed stricter provisions on the reduction of 
environmentally hazardous ingredients in fuels in early 
2013. This regulation had been prevented by state-owned 
groups for years. Right after taking over, the new govern-
ment also passed a three-year program for the reduction 
of pollutant emissions in sewage cleaning and waste in-
cineration.
Social security and income distribution 
The expansion of social security systems and a more 
balanced income distribution have been at the center of 
the government’s agenda under the Hu-Wen-Adminis-
tration (2002–2012). The new Premier, the budget plans 
for 2013 and several recently issued policies leave no 
doubt that the new government will continue to pursue 
this agenda. 
 In his first press conference as a Premier, Li Keqiang 
made it clear that he would work towards an equitable 
society with a more balanced distribution of incomes 
and assets. In particular the living conditions of low-
income rural households and migrant workers in the 
conurbations had to be improved. On the eve of the NPC 
meeting, the government had issued a comprehensive 
national program to spell out its commitment to social 
equity and redistribution. NDRC officials involved in 
drafting the document conceded that redistributive poli-
cies have so far belonged to the least effective areas of 
government activity. 
 The increase in defense spending according to the 
2013 planned budget (+ 10.7 %) remains within the scope 
of state revenue growth from 2012 (plus inflation). Much 
more significant budget increases were granted to civil-
ian affairs. Economic, social and ecological investments 
are clear priorities in the state budget (see table 3 below). 
Innovation and technology
Industrial and technology policies show continuity as 
well. Innovation policy was a matter of the Premier under 
Wen Jiabao. Li Keqiang will likely follow this example. 
The top positions at the Ministry of Industry and Infor-
mation Technology (MIIT), as well as the Ministry of Sci-
ence and Technology (MOST), remained unchanged. This 
includes Minister Wan Gang, who trained as an engineer 
in Germany. MOST is responsible for the innovation strat-
egy of the Chinese government and has considerable pro-
motional budgets from which foreign companies or their 
technology partners in China may benefit as well.
 The government passed a number of important new 
programs for promotion of innovation in the shadow 
of the NPC. Among them is a national long-term plan 
(2012–2030) for the development of a high-performance 
science and technology infrastructure, as well as a pilot 
program for the creation of 15 to 20 comprehensive na-
tional “innovation bases”.
Environment and energy
Government statements consistently stress the promotion 
of a new development model that is supposed to save re-
sources and protect the environment. Since the last de-
cade, the environmental debate in China has been trans-
formed entirely by the rapid spread of interactive digital 
communication (microblogging, smartphone apps provid-
ing air pollution data, etc.). Environmental scandals and 
health hazards belong to the most intensely discussed 
issues on the Chinese-language web. China’s environ-
mental authorities are subject to harsh criticism, as was 
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New directions in economic policy
Development planning and 
investment control
Chinese weblogs and foreign media had speculated about 
a splitting of the NDRC, the most important cross-sectoral 
planning and coordination body. The new government 
decided to take a different path. It confirmed the compe-
tences of the NDRC in strategic planning, coordination 
and crisis prevention. The NDRC’s control over approval of 
specific investments, however, will be delegated to provin-
cial governments. This takes away operative influence in 
economic policy from the NDRC, which is to focus on plan-
ning, evaluating and optimizing governmental programs 
with the objective of economic “macro-control”: It is to en-
sure balanced sustainable growth, industrial and regional 
structural policies, and fair conditions for market compe-
tition, income distribution and price formation. Added to 
this are new tasks in spatial and urbanization planning. 
 At the same time, the planning responsibilities of the 
former Family Planning Commission, which was merged 
with the Ministry of Health, were transferred to the 
NDRC. The option of creating a Ministry of Energy to pro-
vide a consistent supervision of China’s powerful energy 
groups and to integrate the fragmented energy grids had 
been discussed for years. Instead of putting this ministe-
rial plan into practice, the National Energy Agency was 
provided with additional powers but remains under the 
purview of the NDRC.
Reorganizing the state sector
The new Premier used sharp words to make clear that he 
intends to go against vested interest in China’s state in-
dustries and bureaucracies. Moreover, he emphasized that 
he will work to improve the investment and competitive 
conditions for the private sector. The Premier promised 
improved access for private investors in transport, energy 
and finance. His agenda centers on the “limitation of the 
Public security and justice
The statements of the new government on legal, justice 
and police reforms showed little substance to date. After 
remarkable announcements on criminal law reforms, in-
cluding a commitment to curtailing administrative penal-
ties and “re-education through labor”, China’s new deci-
sion-makers have been careful about making any specific 
reform promises recently. 
 The appointment of a top cadre with legal training 
who openly calls for the “rule of law” as the new presi-
dent of the Supreme People’s Court (Zhou Qiang, former 
Party Secretary of Hunan Province) can be interpreted as 
a reform signal. Yet, it is doubtful whether the new court 
president will be able to advance a politically more inde-
pendent role of the courts, as many Chinese lawyers hope.
 The police has so far remained dominant over courts 
and public prosecutors. The security apparatus is repre-
sented by the former Minister of Public Security in the 
Politburo and at the top of the CCP Commission for Poli-
tics and Law. And the newly installed Minister of Public 
Security doubles as State Councilor in the inner cabinet. 
Remarkably, his previous career was in industrial admin-
istration and as provincial party leader, but not in the se-
curity system. The appointment of such a generalist as 
head of police suggests that the new government strives 
for improved control of a particularly obscure part of the 
governmental system. It is also noticeable that the police 
are no longer represented in the Politburo Standing Com-
mittee as was common until 2012.
7not reflected in official data. Government statistics imply 
that only 35 to 40 % of the GDP were contributed by pri-
vate consumption in recent years. Yet, China’s statisti-
cal system records only a portion of private spending on 
health, housing, tourism, E-Commerce (online shopping 
and gaming) and financial services. The actual share of 
consumption in the GDP may be as high as 46 % accord-
ing to a study by Morgan Stanley. The Chinese economy 
has entered a period of consumer-driven realignment. 
Yet, a durable move away from export- and investment-
driven growth would require domestic consumption to 
be growing more strongly than the GDP over the course 
of at least a decade.
 Reforms of the tax system that were announced or 
confirmed by the Ministry of Finance are targeted at 
incentive changes for the private services sector. Local 
pilot schemes to replace the traditional corporate tax by 
a value-added tax have been underway for years. These 
schemes will now be expanded after the pilots demon-
strated that the new tax arrangement serves to boost 
private businesses. According to the Ministry of Finance, 
additional adjustments in the tax system are to relieve 
private companies and encourage them to expand. The 
reduction of administrative approvals and interferences 
that was promised by the Premier is to benefit private 
companies as well.
Financial liberalization 
and currency policy
The composition of the policy team responsible for the 
financial system (from the president of the central bank, 
who remains in office, to the new top securities regulator to 
the first Vice Premier) is aimed at reinforcing the cautious 
liberalization of financial markets and internationalization 
of the Chinese currency that have been undertaken during 
the past three years. 
 The commitment to gradually open the capital account 
further is confirmed by a number of specific measures 
government’s power”, specifically regarding administra-
tive approval procedures and interventions in markets. 
 In line with these statements, the Railway Ministry, 
which had grown into a huge bureaucratic-commercial 
conglomerate, was dismantled. It had in recent years of-
fered lots of opportunities for attack due to spectacular 
corruption scandals and an overwhelming debt load. The 
regulatory functions are to be taken over by the Ministry 
of Transport. The logistics, engineering and other operat-
ing units are being transformed into separate corporate 
units that will be opened to private investors after a tran-
sitional period.
 There were considerable shifts in the policy team for 
state industries within the State Council. The former head 
of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administra-
tion Commission (SASAC) was promoted to the powerful 
position of State Councilor. The SASAC itself was entrust-
ed to the former president of Petrochina, one of the largest 
Chinese state corporations. These reshuffles will work to 
maintain state industries’ influence in the central govern-
ment. Impartial regulatory oversight or even large-scale 
privatizations are hardly to be expected in the light of 
these personnel decisions. 
Promotion of domestic markets 
and the private sector
Regarding the “rebalancing” of the Chinese economy 
(i.e., moving away from export- and investment-driven 
growth), the latest data suggest that the transformation 
of the growth model is making progress. The Premier’s 
work report emphasized that the contribution of domestic 
consumption to growth had increased significantly. He 
also referred to the drastic reduction of the Chinese cur-
rent account surplus (from 10.1 % of the GDP in 2007 to 
only 2.6 % in 2012). 
 Foreign research reports confirm this trend for the 
years of 2011 and 2012. Several consumer market stud-
ies suggest that the growth of private consumption was 
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in the political stability, economic dynamics and market 
yields, China has clearly regained credibility since Xi 
Jinping was appointed General Secretary of the CCP. In 
the year of 2012, China had an unexpectedly high deficit 
in the balance of capital transactions. Since December of 
2012, however, capital flows towards China and the de-
mand for investments in Chinese currency have suddenly 
picked up again. The trust in China’s political stability 
and hope for a substantial appreciation of China’s cur-
rency has returned for the time being. 
Foreign trade and import promotion
Foreign companies operating in China were startled 
when criticism campaigns targeted, among others, 
against Apple and Volkswagen were launched in Chinese 
state media in spring 2013. Since the last decade, the 
Chinese government has been passing a series of indus-
trial policies with a considerable potential for discrimi-
nation against foreign market participants. Complaints 
about curtailment of market access, exclusion from pub-
lic tenders and lack of protection of intellectual property 
rights have been regularly raised by the foreign business 
community in China. 
 The new government has sent many relief signals. 
The Premier’s work report concisely stated that exports 
are to be kept stable while imports will be increased. 
Quality and profitability of exports should be promoted 
instead of mere quantity and market share. Foreign in-
vestments in China will continue to be supported in a tar-
geted way. At the same time, the government will further 
promote investments of Chinese companies in important 
foreign markets.
 In the wake of the NPC session, Xi Jinping promised 
more specific liberalization steps in China’s foreign eco-
nomic relations. Competition between Chinese and for-
eign companies in public procurement and technology 
programs is to be opened up. In return, China hoped that 
other states would open their own markets more widely 
to make China’s securities market more attractive to for-
eign investors. These measures are targeted, among oth-
ers, at increasing dividend payouts, broadening the use of 
shortselling and boosting market access for foreign insti-
tutional investors. Liberalization steps in capital transac-
tions with Taiwan confirm this basic trend, as does the in-
creased use of the Chinese currency in trade transactions 
with several important partner countries. The progressing, 
yet carefully controlled, opening of the Chinese financial 
market will provide foreign investors with many new fields 
of business. 
 The new government, however, had few specific news 
on the most virulent sources of crisis in the financial sys-
tem. Local public debt continues to be a threatening “black 
hole” for both the financial and fiscal system. Credit ex-
pansion through the “shadow banking system” (loans and 
bonds provided outside of the official banking or fiscal 
system) progressed in an uncontrolled way in 2012. Local 
governments use loans and bonds that are raised through 
weakly regulated investment firms and special vehicles 
(outside of the formal budget) to fund public investments 
and public services. The rapidly increasing debt hidden in 
this shadow system is a very difficult challenge for finan-
cial regulators. It may soon require the central govern-
ment to provide immense amounts of money to stabilize 
local budgets. 
 The newly appointed Minister of Finance, Lou Jiwei, 
is a dedicated financial reformer who will likely cause 
the Ministry of Finance to turn more energetically to-
wards the restructuring of local public budgets than in 
the recent past. The financial strength of the center would 
permit a fiscal restructuring program. In contrast to the 
local governments, the accumulated budgetary deficit of 
the central government is moderate at around 20 % of the 
GDP. For 2013, the annual deficit is not expected to rise 
above 2 % of the GDP. 
 If we take the foreign capital investments flowing into 
China as a scale for the trust of international investors 
9been missed by the Western media. Within the NDRC, 
Yang Weimin, one of the leading Chinese development 
planners of the last two decades, had worked towards a 
shift to functional spatial planning with strong ecologi-
cal components under the influence of German, Dutch 
and Japanese spatial policies. A series of cross-provin-
cial development plans was passed since the middle of 
the last decade. Since 2011, these plans have been part 
of a national spatial strategy and the object of a series 
of new regulations that are to ensure cross-regionally 
coordinated development. Both NDRC and the Ministry 
of Finance made it clear in their work reports that the 
implementation of the novel strategy will be among the 
core tasks of the planners and budgeters. Ambitious 
experimental programs and pilot projects for the next 
years have been announced. 
 An entirely new policy team was assembled for the 
goals of urbanization and spatial planning. A former Min-
ister of Land Administration and Resources (geologist Xu 
Shaoshi) became the new high-profile head of the NDRC. 
The Premier and his first deputy (Zhang Gaoli) will per-
sonally supervise this policy area. Apart from this, spa-
tial planning pioneer Yang Weimin was appointed dep-
uty head of the Central Financial and Economic Leading 
Group’s staff office which serves as a strategy center for 
the top party leadership. According to Yang Weimin’s 
conceptions, functional spatial planning will offer new 
instruments for transiting to a gentle growth model that 
preserves the environment and resources while also 
opening up new opportunities for guiding cross-regional 
development and internal migration. 
Health and family planning 
Western media interpreted the integration of the long-
standing Family Planning Commission into an overarch-
ing National Health and Family Planning Commission 
(ministerial rank) as the first sign for abolition of birth 
control. A high-level official responsible for the reorgani-
to Chinese investors and companies. China was decisive-
ly opposed to any kind of protectionism. 
 This official rhetoric did not substantially differ from 
that of the previous government. Yet, the current pro-
motion of domestic demand, which includes a gradual 
appreciation of the Chinese currency and an increase of 
high-quality imports, and the national innovation strat-
egy that depends on foreign know-how will likely help 
improve the conditions for foreign companies. The new 
Chinese government strives to forestall trade conflicts 
with the U.S. and the EU by promising regulatory con-
cessions and with a view to gaining reciprocal market 
access for Chinese overseas investments. 
New Priorities and Initiatives 
Urbanization and spatial planning
The new Premier and his government have great hopes 
in a planned urbanization as a source for growth into the 
next decade. The infrastructural, technological and edu-
cational modernization of rural regions is to contribute 
to reducing the gap between urban and rural living con-
ditions and to create new income opportunities for cur-
rently disadvantaged parts of the population. In 2012, the 
expenditure increases for urbanization and integrated 
rural-urban development were already much higher than 
those for other major policy areas (table 3). The new Pre-
mier turned this program into a central element of his 
agenda, even though this is reflected less conspicuously 
in the 2013 budget than in the personnel reshuffles and 
policy statements of the new government. 
 The promotion of a novel approach to national spa-
tial planning, with a diversity of functional, priority and 
protected zones, has become a fixed point in the govern-
ment’s agenda. The approach was emphasized in every 
government work report presented to the NPC but has 
10
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social consequences of a rapidly ageing society, it is likely 
that birth control policies will be gradually relaxed. 
Combating corruption
The Supreme Procuratorate’s work report states that in-
vestigations against more than 210,000 officials were 
initiated due to abuse of office and corruption between 
2008 and 2013. Among them, there were about 13,000 
leadership cadres (i.e., county heads and above) and even 
30 top-level cadres of the rank of minister or governor. 
The investigations had led to 19,000 court proceedings 
against officials.
zation denied this: the merger of the two governmental 
bodies was designed to improve administrative capaci-
ties; planning competences in family policy were trans-
ferred to the NDRC for the purpose of reducing ministe-
rial overlap. 
 Many demography researchers in China have been 
recommending a loosening or abolition of birth quotas 
and controls for many years, in order to stem the im-
minent decline of the working population and achieve a 
more balanced age structure. Fundamental revisions of 
this policy are, however, coming along only slowly. Since 
the NDRC will focus on the destabilizing economic and 
Table 3: Government priorities in the light of budget expenditures
Source: Budget report of the Ministry of Finance to the NPC, 5 March 2013
Budget expenditures of 
the central government Increases 2012 implemented plannedIncreases 2013
Social affairs (incl. rural 
living conditions)
Health
Social security and employment
Education
Culture, sports, media
+ 17.2 %
+ 22.0 %
+ 15.7 %
+ 18.9 %
+ 27.1 %
+ 13.9 %
+ 9.3 %
+ 9.3 %
Urbanization and integrated 
rural-urban development
Apartment construction
Agriculture, forestry, 
water management
Transport and traffi c
+ 44.9 %
+ 25.3 %
+ 20.3 %
+ 5.3 %
+ 3.3 %
+ 0.1 %
Other major areas of spending
Energy effi ciency and 
environmental protection
Science and technology
Defense
Public security
+ 23.1 %
+ 12.7 %
+ 11.6 %
+ 10.9 %
+ 5.1 %
+ 10.4 %
+ 10.7 %
+ 7.9 %
Total expenditures + 13.7 % + 8.4 %
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 Particularly noticeable is the announcement that 
registration procedures for business associations in 
the private economy will be simplified. In the future, 
business associations will no longer need to find a state 
guarantor organization but can register directly with 
the Ministry of Civil Affairs. The government strives to 
reduce the “overly high thresholds” for the founding of 
social organizations and supports a “separation of gov-
ernment and society” with the aim of promoting social 
self-organization. Competing business associations are 
to be permitted in one and the same industry (whereas 
an industry-related representation monopoly used to ap-
ply in the past). A much less restrictive approval process 
was announced specifically for associations in the fields 
of business, science, technology and charity. This may 
be indicative of a promising “small political reform” that 
will permit more pluralism of interests for the benefit of 
the private sector. However, restrictive provisions con-
tinue to apply to associations in the fields of politics, law 
and religion, as well as for transnational non-govern-
mental associations.
 Western hopes for a Gorbachev-like sudden leap in 
political reform by the Chinese government are not ap-
propriate, however. Xi Jinping soberly stated early this 
year that reform was not a single large event, but a se-
ries of step-by-step adjustments. Under the new Chinese 
government, political change therefore can primarily be 
expected as an indirect consequence of liberalization 
and innovation steps that are pursued in economic and 
technology policy. The resulting shifts in popular com-
munication, values and expectations as well as acute cri-
ses and scandals will continue to drive political change 
in China.
 The new party and government leadership took ac-
tion with a number of simple down-to-earth and therefore 
potentially credible anti-corruption measures. This year, 
there is to be, e.g., a moratorium against the construction 
of new government buildings. The costs for official cars, 
banquets and travels of state employees are to be capped. 
Luxury watches must no longer be worn in official func-
tions. These measures against the conspicuous consump-
tion habits of party and government cadres showed quick 
effects, even though it remains highly doubtful whether 
the current forceful campaign will be conducive to es-
tablishing credible rules permanently. Since the new 
measures are targeted at wasteful and corrupt acts that 
can be observed in public, China’s netizens and micro-
bloggers act as willing helpers to document and denounce 
violations of the rules.
 At the same time, the anti-corruption measures of the 
new government show a considerable willingness to ex-
periment. On the real-estate market, for example, a per-
son- or organization-based national registration number 
is to be introduced as transaction ID to limit straw men 
transactions as well as speculation and corruption. If im-
plemented consistently, this kind of national system may 
simplify regulation of China’s shadowy, and oftentimes 
mafia-like, real estate sector.
Political reforms in the small print
Beyond the new approaches to combating corruption, im-
portant political initiatives are hidden in the small-print 
explanations on working methods of the new government 
that were issued by the State Council General Office and 
the Commission for Public Sector Reform. These expla-
nations contain, for example, instructions for develop-
ing procedures of periodic “evaluation and correction” 
of government programs. Binding provisions on public 
accountability and reporting by state agencies are to be 
issued as well.
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